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abstract
In recent years, a number of new trends have seen light at the intersection of
semantics and philosophy of language. They are meant to address puzzles
raised by the context-sensitivity of a variety of natural language
constructions, such as knowledge ascriptions, belief reports, epistemic
modals, indicative conditionals, quantifier phrases, gradable adjectives,
temporal constructions, vague predicates, moral predicates, predicates of
personal taste, etc. A diversity of labels have consequently emerged, such as
‘contextualism’, ‘indexicalism’, ‘invariantism’, ‘literalism’, ‘minimalism’,
‘relativism’, variously qualified. The goal of this essay is to pinpoint the issues
that lie at the heart of the recent debates, clarify what is at stake, and provide
a snapshot of the current theoretical landscape.
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1. Literalism vs. contextualism
Though it is customary to talk of the contextualism/literalism debate, or of
the contextualism/relativism debate, the use of the definite article is
misleading in both cases, since there appears to be a family of debates, on
different fronts, that seem to fit these labels equally well. We will see, for
example, that a position that counts as “relativist” in the light of one debate
may well count as “contextualist” from the point of view of another debate.
Throughout the paper, I will be striving to disentangle the terminological web
that covers the field and threatens to blur the issues under discussion. For the
sake of simplicity, I will describe the differences among the various positions
in relation to a specific topic, that of quantifier domain restriction. Even
though domain-dependence has not been of major interest to relativism, the
choice is methodological, since the parameters at stake are easy to isolate, and
the range of possible positions fairly easy to delineate. In this section, I will
discuss the contextualism/literalism debate. Once the different contextualist
positions have become more clear, the goal of Section 2 will be to disentangle
those from the recently emerged relativist positions. Section 3 offers a broad
survey of the range of topics that have been the concern of the debates, with
references to the literature.
Suppose that at a symposium on semantics, the following dialogue takes
place between Josh and Marsha:
(1) Josh: Are there any philosophers?
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(2) Marsha: Yes, though most people are linguists.
According to the literalist, what Josh (literally) asked in (1) is whether there
are any philosophers tout court, and Marsha’s answer in (2) is made true by
the mere existence of some philosopher somewhere, regardless of how things
stand at the symposium. And while her answer to Josh’s question is almost
trivially true, what she further says is almost trivially false, since, according to
the literalist, it means that most people in the universe are linguists. In other
words, literalism holds that quantifier words such as ‘there are’, ‘most’,
‘every’, etc. always behave the way we would take them to behave in e.g.
“There are no unicorns” or “Most people have an IQ over 80”; that is, that
they quantify over everything. Minimalism is, so to speak, literalism
generalized: it holds that the only cases in which context can have an impact
on truth value are those of resolving lexical and syntactic ambiguities and of
determining the reference of indexical pronouns such as ‘I’, ‘this’, or ‘today’.
Contextualism (broadly understood) is the view that Marsha’s answer in
(2) isn’t made true by the mere existence of some philosopher somewhere, but
only by there being some philosophers in the domain relevant in the context
in which the sentence is uttered and/or evaluated for truth. In our case, it
would typically be the domain consisting of the people attending the
symposium. Similarly, for her sentence in (2) to be true, it is only required that
most people in the contextually restricted domain are linguists.
The literalism/contextualism debate directly concerns semantics, in the
sense that there is no agreement on what the truth values of given sentences
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(in given contexts) are. In a situation in which 90% of the people at the
symposium are linguists, the literalist predicts that what Marsha says in (2) is
false, while the contextualist predicts that it is true. The data gathered in the
literature on quantifiers appear to show that ordinary speakers’ intuitions on
truth value are more in line with the contextualist predictions than with the
literalist. Literalism thus faces the problem of explaining away the accuracy of
ordinary speakers’ intuitions, and its proponents typically argue that what
speakers’ intuitions actually track is some level of pragmatically conveyed
content, rather than semantic content itself.1
While contextualism is the mainstream view with respect to quantifier
domain restriction, there remains considerable disagreement on the issue of
how context is involved in determining the truth values of sentences
containing quantifiers. The first branching point is on the question of whether
there is something either in the meaning or in the syntax of the expressions
used that calls for domain restriction, the alternative being that the context
somehow in and by itself restricts the domain of quantification. Hence:
(a) mainstream contextualism: there is some lexical, syntactic or semantic
level at which the contextual restriction over the domain of quantification is
represented.
(b) radical contextualism: there is nothing, at any linguistic level, that calls
for domain restriction – rather, it is the result of optional or “free” pragmatic
1 In other words, literalists hold that speakers often mistake what is conveyed for what is said
(on this distinction, see Grice 1989). For a critical discussion of the role of speakers’
intuitions for semantics, see e.g. (Bach 1994).
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processes.2
It is important to realize that the position in (a) actually stands for a whole
family of positions. The differences primarily concern the level at which the
contextual restriction is taken care of, but even when this is agreed upon,
there may still be even more subtle divergences among the various authors.
What follows is a rough survey of the most easily identifiable positions:
(i) syntactic ellipsis: there is a mismatch between the phonological and the
syntactic form; e.g. the sentence in (1) is really “Are there at this symposium
any philosophers?” and in (2), “Most people at this symposium are linguists.”
(ii) implicit arguments with domain variables: the logical form of (2) is
something like: [Most x: Human x & x∈Y](Linguist x), where Y is a variable
that takes as its values sets of things (individuals, objects or events). Thus in
(2), the value that it would take is something like the domain of things that
are relevantly related to the symposium.
2 The “mainstream” vs. “radical” terminology is mine. I have deliberately avoided using the
“moderate” vs. “radical” terminology, since it is used differently by different authors. For
instance, for (Recanati 2004), both moderate and radical contextualism would fall under
option (b): the difference is that his “moderate” contextualist does not deny that sentences
may have a compositionally determined “literal” meaning, obtained from the conventional
meanings of the words in the sentence and from its syntax, while his “radical”
contextualist holds that the notion of literal meaning is difficult to even make sense of.
What I am calling “mainstream contextualism” comes closest to what (Recanati 2004) calls
“indexicalism”. On the other hand, (Cappelen and Lepore 2005) distinguish “moderate”
from “radical” contextualism depending on how many expressions are taken to depend on
the context. For them, one is a contextualist as soon as one allows some context-
dependence over and above that of some basic set of context-dependent expressions (such
as indexical pronouns), and one becomes a “radical” contextualist by arriving at the view
that all expressions in the language depend on the context in one way or another. Thus
their way of distinguishing two forms of contextualism turns out to be orthogonal to the
line drawn between (a) and (b).
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(iii) implicit arguments with predicate variables: the logical form of (2) is
something like: [Most x: Human x & Px](Linguist x), where P is a second-
order variable that takes as its values predicates. Thus in (2), it would
presumably take something like the complex predicate ‘attending the
symposium’.
(iv) implicit arguments without variables: the lexical semantics of the
quantifier phrase itself requires an argument, presumably a domain over
which the quantifier ranges. There are no hidden variables in the logical form;
rather, a contextually restricted domain is provided directly at the stage of
semantic interpretation.3
(v) parameters in the point of evaluation: the output of semantic
interpretation is something that will return a truth value only with respect to
a point of evaluation, and part of what the latter specifies (other than the time
and world of evaluation), are the domains over which the quantifiers range.
Thus neither the syntactic nor the semantic representation of (2) depend on
the context, but the truth value may still vary, depending on whether (2) is
evaluated with respect to the symposium, or to some other situation or group
of people, or to the entire universe.
The positions in (ii) and (iii) probably represent the dominant approach to
quantifier domain restriction: see e.g. (Westerståhl 1985), (Stanley and
3 This sort of position may be attributed e.g. to (Jacobson 1999).
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Williamson 1995), (Stanley and Szabó 2000), or (Peters and Westerståhl 2006).
We will shortly see that (v) may be seen as a form of relativism, since it
allows that the same sentence, with respect to the same context of utterance,
may take different truth values, so long as it is evaluated with respect to
different points of evaluation. A particular version of the position in (v) would
be to say that the point that determines the truth value of a sentence (with
respect to a context of utterance) is that point which corresponds to the
context of utterance. We will shortly return to this issue, but what matters at
this stage is that the differences among (i)-(v) are not, properly speaking,
semantic differences. For, all these positions largely agree on the truth values
that a sentence containing a quantifier phrase ought to be assigned (with
respect to a given context). The differences among these frameworks reside in
the ways in which truth value is derived from the meaning and the syntax of
the sentence, certain facts about the context, and possibly other parameters.
To sum up, the central difference between literalist and contextualist
approaches, at least in how they handle quantifier phrases, is that they
provide different predictions of truth value. Literalism, and minimalism in
particular, systematically predict truth values that fail to conform to speakers’
intuitions, having thus to argue that conformity to intuitions is not a criterion
for semantic content. On the other hand, there is agreement, among the
different forms of contextualism, that the success of a theory should be tested
by its ability to account for the data, which are obtained by canvassing for
speakers’ intuitions. But there is also (internal) disagreement, on the question
of how precisely to account for those data, hence disagreement on various
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aspects internal to the semantic machinery, or related to its interface with
syntax and with the lexicon.
2. The Emergence of relativism
Before addressing the differences among the various relativist positions in
relation to quantifier domain restriction, let me try to give you a sense of the
intuition underlying relativism in relation to time. Consider the following
claim:
(3) Tokyo is the capital of Japan.
While (3) is true, one might ask whether it has always been true. And, given
that in the past, Kyoto used to be the capital of Japan, it does not seem
incorrect to say the claim made in (3), though true now, was not always true
in the past. The intuition that the truth value of (3) may vary with time is what
relativism with respect to time, or temporalism, tries to capture.
Now, it is important to keep clear the distinction between temporalism and
the uncontroversial idea that the truth value of (3) may depend on time. Of
course, a sentence such as “Josh is sitting” may be true if uttered while Josh is
sitting, and false if uttered while he is standing. What temporalism insists on
is not that the sentence in (3), if uttered at different times, may be assigned
different truth values. Rather, it is that the sentence in (3) as uttered in 2008
expresses something that is now true, but used to be false.
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The difference between the two ways in which truth value depends on
times, viz. relativity vs. mere context-dependency, is quite clear in the case of
future contingents. Suppose that I say the following on Tuesday:
(4) It will rain tomorrow.
Suppose that it does rain on Wednesday, but not on Thursday. Intuitively,
(4) is neither true nor false on Tuesday, given that the course of future events
is still indeterminate at that point, but once it becomes settled that it would
rain on Wednesday, (4) becomes true. Thus we ought to be able to evaluate (4)
with respect to Wednesday – but note that when we do so, the time with
respect to which we interpret the indexical ‘tomorrow’ is Tuesday and not
Wednesday (otherwise (4) would end up being false).
Examples that involve future contingents show that the sensitivity of truth
value to time cannot be reduced to context-sensitivity. This further sensitivity
to time is not incompatible, though, with contextualist semantics. While the
time of the context of utterance is relevant to determining the semantic values
of temporal indexicals like ‘tomorrow’, the time of the context of assessment is
relevant to determining the truth value of the utterance as a whole.4
This relativist move is applicable, albeit not as immediately as in the case of
time, to domains of quantification. Reconsider the example from Section 1,
and suppose that the following is said while talking about the symposium:
4 It must be stressed that one can adopt a relativist solution to future contingents without
subscribing to temporalism in general, that is, without accepting that the truth value of
present-tensed claims such as (3) may vary with time. Such a view, arguably defended in
(MacFarlane 2002), would apply the same treatment to (unembedded) tense as to (overt)
temporal indexicals. For an alternative, non-relativist approach to future contingents, see
e.g. (Bonomi and Del Prete 2008).
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(5) Most people are linguists.
Intuitively, (5) is true. However, one might ask whether it remains true in
some larger situation, such as the one whose domain includes not only the
linguists’ symposium, but, say, all the symposia currently held at a certain
convention center. And one could well hold that what (5) expresses, though
true in the “small” situation where almost everyone is a linguist, is false with
respect to the larger situation where linguists are a minority.5 The idea is, then,
that not only the truth value of the sentence in (5) depends on a domain of
quantification, but even when the sentence is used in a particular context, that
which it expresses still varies in truth value across different domains. There
are several ways in which this idea may be fleshed out. Note, however, that
the proposed classification may reveal an idiosyncratic perspective on the
issue, and is not generally agreed upon.6
(I) standard relativism: the output of semantic interpretation is a
function from points of evaluation to truth values, but the point of
evaluation specifies not only a possible world and a time, but also a
domain of quantification.
5 This sort of suggestion may be found, for instance, in (Barwise and Perry 1983) and
(Barwise 1989); see also (Recanati 1997).
6 As of now, there is no classification generally agreed upon, and the issue of which proposal
defends which form of relativism, or of how the various forms of relativism differ from one
another and depart from the various versions of contextualism, has been the topic of
several recent papers (see e.g. (López de Sa 2007), just to mention one).
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(II) assessment-relativism: the truth value of a sentence is a function not
only of a context that settles the interpretation of indexicals, called
context of utterance, and of a point of evaluation, but also of another
context, called context of assessment (which may but need not
coincide with the context of utterance).
(III) metaphysical relativism: the output of semantic interpretation is a
function from points of evaluation to truth values, and the points of
evaluation are merely possible worlds, but the facts themselves that
determine the values of that function are relative, rather than
absolute.
To see to what amounts the position that I call “metaphysical relativism”,
often believed to be relativism par excellence, reconsider (3). The idea would be
that the semantic interpretation of that sentence gives us a certain proposition,
namely, that Tokyo is the capital of Japan, and this proposition can be thought
of as a function f that, if you give it a possible world as input, returns a truth
value as output. Take wA to be the actual world. Metaphysical relativism
would thus hold that the value of f(wA) is True, but there were times in the
past when the value of f(wA) was False (namely, while Kyoto was the capital
of Japan).7
Now, from the point of view of set theory, a one-place function that, given
7 A form of relativism of a similar sort is arguably defended in (MacFarlane 2008), even if at
other places, he holds a position closer to assessment-relativism (indeed, the terminology
of contexts of assessment comes from his work).
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an argument, returns value True, just cannot be the same function as one that,
given the same argument, returns False. The only way to make sense of the
idea that a function semantically associated with a sentence returns different
truth values given one and the same argument, is that it is a two-place rather
than a one-place function, and that the difference in truth value results from
the difference in the second argument. But this would make metaphysical
relativism collapse into standard relativism, and a metaphysical relativist
would presumably insist that part of her point is precisely the rejection of the
standard set-theoretic approach.
It is for similar reasons that I find it problematic to describe the
disagreement between contextualists and relativists as disagreement on the
issue of whether the truth of propositions is relativized. For, the notion of
proposition is primarily a theoretical artifact, used in describing and modeling
a variety of phenomena, and it has become customary to reserve the term
‘proposition’ for the kind of item that returns a truth value when evaluated at
a possible world, and to use a qualified or different term for the similar kind
of item that returns a truth value when evaluated at a possible world and
some other parameter(s) – e.g. ‘temporal proposition’ when it requires a time
parameter, or, more generally, ‘propositional function’. To describe relativism
as the view that the truth of propositions is relativized (to times, domains, or
whatever else) would, then, seem to turn it into a proposal about terminology,
rather than about any substantial issue.
Turning now to the position that I am calling “standard relativism”, note
that it has already been listed in Section 1 as a “contextualist” position.
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Indeed, the difference between standard contextualism, which typically uses
implicit arguments for elements on which the truth value turns out to depend
(such as domains of quantification), and standard relativism, which, instead of
using implicit arguments, makes room for such elements in the point of
evaluation, is perhaps an interesting difference from the point of view of the
syntax-semantics interface, but much less so from the point of view of
semantics alone. The output of “contextualist” semantic interpretation, when
evaluated with respect to an assignment of values to implicit arguments, will
normally return the same truth value as the output of “relativist” semantic
interpretation, when applied to a point of evaluation whose parameters are
assigned the same values as those that were assigned to the corresponding
implicit arguments in the former case.8
Now, positions such as standard relativism are sometimes “accused” of
being contextualist for a different and, I believe, not entirely justified reason, a
discussion of which will reveal another way of distinguishing relativism from
contextualism. Following (Kaplan 1989), it is widely accepted that in
languages containing indexicals, the truth value of a sentence depends on two
things: a first parameter, usually called context, which is responsible for the
interpretation of indexicals, and a second parameter, a point of evaluation,
which consists at least of a possible world parameter, but may contain other
parameters, such as a time parameter, a standards-of-precision parameter, as
in (Lewis 1980), and why not a domain-of-quantification parameter.9 This
8 The equivalence is shown e.g. in (Stojanovic 2008), but the technical results on which it
relies have been long known from model-theory of modal logics; see e.g. (Kuhn 1980).
9 Following (Kaplan 1989) and (Lewis 1980), it is often assumed that contexts and points of
evaluation are differently structured, and that contexts involve an agent parameter,
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assumption, widely shared by contemporary semantic theories, reveals
something like a triadic conception of truth:
standard relativist conception of truth: truth3 is a property of a sentence S,
with respect to a context C, relative to a point of evaluation E.
In other words, truth is less of a property and more of a three-place relation
among sentences, contexts, and points of evaluation.
Now, it may be tempting to try reducing truth to what it appears to be at
face value, namely a property. The first step is to arrive at a dyadic conception
of truth:
standard reductionist conception of truth: truth2 is a property of a
sentence S, with respect to a context C, which obtains if and only if
truth3 obtains of S, with respect to C, and relative to the point of
evaluation EC that consists of the corresponding features of context C.
Finally, rather than assigning truth value to sentences in contexts, one might
want to talk of utterances being true simpliciter, thereby arriving at monadic
truth:
responsible for interpreting the indexical ‘I’, while points of evaluation don’t. But, as
Kaplan himself recognized (Kaplan 1989: 511 fn), there is some arbitrariness in deciding
what to count as “aspects of contexts” and what to count as “features of cirumstances” (i.e.
of points of evaluation). I should also mention that the two parameters are called
differently by different authors: in (Kaplan 1989), it is “context” and “circumstance”, in
(Lewis 1980), it is “context” and “index”, in (Predelli 2005), it is “index” and “point of
evaluation”, etc.
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utterance-contextualist conception of truth: truth1 is a property of an
utterance u of sentence S, which obtains if and only if truth2obtains of
S with respect to the context of utterance u.
I am not sure whether it makes much sense to ask which, if any, among these
conceptions is the right one. Arguably, truth3 is indispensable, because that is
the notion deployed in compositional semantics. It may be suggested that
truth1 is at least useful, because ordinary speakers intuitions on truth are
typically elicited by presenting speakers with particular utterances, rather
than theoretical artifacts of the form (sentence, context, point of evaluation).
But what about truth2? It has been held that truth2 is the notion of truth
required for logic. In particular, (Kaplan 1989: 547) defines logical validity in
terms of it: “[Formula] is valid (...) iff for every structure U, and everyφ
context c of U, is true inφ c (in U).” However, the idea that the Kaplanian
conception of validity is the right one seems to me just as questionable as the
idea that, say, truth2, rather than truth1 or truth3, is the right conception of
truth. In particular, one can also hold that is valid iff for every structure U,φ
every context c of U, and every point of evaluation e of U, is true inφ c at e (in
U).10
Turning back to the distinction among the different forms of relativism
proposed in the beginning of this section, reconsider the view that handles
quantifier domain restriction by positing a domain parameter in the point of
10 Kaplan himself acknowledged the possible definition of validity based on truth-of-a-
sentence-in-a-context-at-a-point-of-evaluation, and called it “neotraditional” (Kaplan 1989:
549). For a discussion of the two notions of validity, see e.g. (Predelli and Stojanovic 2008).
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evaluation (listed under (I) or, equivalently, under (v) in Section 1). The mere
presence of a domain parameter in the point of evaluation does not warrant
that such a view will count as relativist. Indeed, “contextualism” is sometimes
understood as applying to views that embody either a monadic or a dyadic
conception of truth. Hence if standard relativism is paired with the
assumption that the domain of evaluation that determines truth value must
be the same as the domain of the context, the resulting position will provide
the same predictions of truth value as any of the contextualist positions (i) to
(iv) from Section 1. In turn, the issue of whether to classify such a position
under “contextualism” or under “relativism” is pretty much up for grabs.11
Let me end this section with a brief discussion of some motivations behind
assessment-relativism. As noted earlier, the dependence of truth value on
some parameter, such as the time parameter, cannot always be reduced to the
phenomenon of context-dependence known from the study of indexicality. In
particular, it is widely held that the time relevant to interpreting temporal
indexicals like ‘today’ or ‘tomorrow’, but also tense, is contributed by the
context of utterance. However, sentences that report contingent future events
arguably lack a truth value when evaluated at the time of utterance, and only
start having one when evaluated at some future time at which the course of
events has been settled. It can thus be said that the truth of such sentences
depends not only on the context of utterance, but also on what came to be
called a context of assessment. Although this kind of motivation is peculiar to
11 (MacFarlane 2007) has dubbed that sort of position “non-indexical contextualism.” What is
important to see, though, is that what would justify the label “contextualism” is not so
much the failure to relativize truth to something like a context of assessment, but rather,
the underlying reductionist conception of truth.
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future contingents, assessment-relativism has been proposed as a solution to a
variety of other issues, and motivated with a variety of other considerations.
For reasons of space, I shall only mention one. It has to do with the idea that
an assessment-sensitive sentence and its negation express a contradiction even
when they are assessed from different contexts and can be therefore both true.
Epistemic modals are the case at point: if I tell you that it might be raining
outside, and you tell me that it can’t be raining, we are contradicting each
other, even if my evidence allows for the possibility that it is raining (hence
what I say is true with respect to my own context of assessment), while you
have conclusive evidence that it is not raining outside (hence what you say is
true with respect to your own context of assessment). Assessment-sensitive
expressions thus contrast with indexicals: said by different speakers, “I am
sitting. – No, I am not sitting” is simply an infelicitous exchange. More
importantly, they also contrast with expressions that one might want to
handle by adding an appropriate parameter in the point of evaluation.
Reconsider domain restriction. While one may be happy with the idea that the
sentence “Most people are linguists” as used in a given context may still
receive different truth values if evaluated at different domains, it is also clear
that if I tell you that sentence while speaking about the linguists’ symposium,
and you reply “No, most people aren’t linguists” while talking about
something else (say, your department, or some other symposium), then, even
if at face value we seem to be contradicting each other, our apparent
disagreement clearly rests upon a misunderstanding.12
12 It is probably for this reason that assessment-relativism has, to my knowledge, not been
defeneded in the case of quantifier domain restriction.
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3. The Scope of the debate
My primary goal has been not only to explain how contextualism departs
from literalism, and how relativism departs from contextualism, but also to
point out some subtle differences among positions that may be said to belong
to one and the same camp. What I want to do in this last section is briefly go
over a number of topics that have been the concern of the debate, and provide
some references. It goes without saying that different types of expressions
may need different treatments, hence one should not expect there to be a view
that will apply to all the cases equally well.
Knowledge ascriptions
Epistemology is an area for which contextualism has been of particular
importance. Traditionally, the verb ‘know’ was not considered to be context-
sensitive, so the received view was literalism – or, to use the preferred term,
invariantism. Invariantist views disagree nevertheless on the necessary and
sufficient truth conditions for ascriptions of the form ‘S knows that p’.
Skeptical invariantism proposes such stringent conditions that virtually every
knowledge ascription comes out false, while moderate (insensitive) invariantism
proposes conditions in the spirit of the “justified true belief” analysis of
knowledge. Epistemic contextualism arose as a response to this debate, trying
to reconcile the intuitions behind both views by suggesting that the truth
conditions of knowledge ascriptions depend on the epistemic standards at
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play in the context in which the ascription is made. In response to
contextualism, a new form of invariantism arose: subject-sensitive, or interest-
relative, invariantism, which holds that knowledge ascriptions, while
insensitive to the context, are sensitive to the goals and interests of the subject
to whom knowledge is ascribed. Another reaction to contextualism was
relativism, which holds that the truth value of a knowledge ascription does
not depend, or, at least, does not only depend on the context of ascription and
the subject’s interests, but (also) on the context from which the ascription is
being evaluated, or assessed, for its truth value. Since the literature on this
topic is very vast, the proposed references will be easily found wanting, but
nevertheless: for skeptical invariantism, see (Unger 1979); for moderate
insensitive invariantism, see (Williamson 2000, 2005); for subject-sensitive
invariantism, see (Hawthorne 2004) and (Stanley 2005); for contextualism, see
(DeRose 1992), (Lewis 1996), (Rysiew 2001), (Kompa 2003), (Lawlor 2005),
(Blome-Tillmann 2006), and articles in (Preyer and Peter (ed.) 2005:12-130),
covering both sides of the debate; for relativism, see (MacFarlane 2005); for
the specific case of self-ascriptions of knowledge, see (Bonnay and Egré 2008).
Belief reports
Consider the sentence “Josh believes that Gordon Sumner is a great singer”
and suppose that Josh believes indeed of that person that he is a great singer,
but only knows him under his stage name ‘Sting’. Then it is customary to say
that on its de re reading, the sentence is true, while on its de dicto reading, it is
false. Although the problem was brought up more than a century ago in
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(Frege 1892), the debate still goes on as to whether there is indeed such an
ambiguity, and how it should be handled. Literalism denies the ambiguity (or,
at least, its relevance to semantics), recognizing only the de re reading; see
(Salmon 1986), (Soames 1987), and more recently (Taylor 2007). Contextualist
manoeuvres include taking the ‘that’-clause itself to be context-sensitive in
more or less the same way in which demonstrative pronouns are (Richard
1993), taking the verb ‘believe’ to involve an implicit argument for the mode
of presentation in which the content of belief is believed by the believer
(Crimmins and Perry 1989), allowing free pragmatic processes in the
interpretation of belief reports (Recanati 1993), and so on. In (Predelli 2005:
161-183), a version of what I have described as standard relativism is applied
to the problem of belief reports.
Epistemic modals and indicative conditionals
Sentences like “Josh might be in the garage” and “If he isn’t in the garage, he’s
in the basement” appear to depend for their truth value not only on how
things are in the world (viz. on where Josh actually is), but also on the
available information.13 Contextualists hold that the information relevant to
truth value is the contextually available information: either that to which the
speaker herself has access, or that available to some larger group.14 On the
other hand, relativists hold that the truth value may vary depending on the
13 Partly because of this, but also because of their peculiar syntactic behavior, (Edgington
1995) and (Bennett 2003) hold that indicative conditionals are simply not truth-evaluable.
14 The two proposals correspond to the distinction between “solipsistic” and “non-
solipsistic” contextualism in terms of (MacFarlane 2006).
the contextualism/literalism/relativism debate 20
information available to the person who evaluates the modal or the
conditional for its truth value. For instance, “Josh might be in the garage”
would be true from the point of view of the speaker while being false from the
point of view of a better informed person who has just seen him in the
basement. For contextualist treatments of indicative conditionals, see e.g.
(Bradley 2002) and (Stalnaker 2005), and of epistemic modals, e.g. (von Fintel
and Gillies 2008). For relativist treatments of epistemic modals, see e.g. (Egan
et al. 2005), (MacFarlane 2006) or (Stephenson 2007).
Time and tense
Although temporalism has its origin in presocratic philosophy, with Stoics
and Megarians, its logical and semantic foundations should be traced to
(Prior 1957), following whose work most semantic frameworks, including
(Kaplan 1989) and (Lewis 1980), include a time parameter in the point of
evaluation. As noted earlier, the mere presence of this parameter does not
necessarily give rise to a relativist framework – thus e.g. the framework in
(Kaplan 1989), in which the preferred notion of truth is the dyadic truth-in-a-
context (as opposed to the triadic truth-in-a-context-at-a-point-of-evaluation), is
typically classified as contextualist. For criticisms of temporalism, see e.g.
(Evans 1985) and more recently (King 2003); for defense, see e.g. (Dummett
1997), (Recanati 2007: 53-86). For a relativist treatment of time slightly
different from standard temporalism, see (MacFarlane 2002, 2008).
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Location
It is widely agreed that sentences such as ‘It is raining’, rather than being true
or false simpliciter, take a truth value depending on the context, and, in
particular, on some contextually salient location.15What is not yet agreed
upon is how this location-dependence comes about. According to (Stanley
2000), it is due to an implicit argument, handled at the level of syntax. (Taylor
2007) holds that the location argument comes directly from the lexical
meaning of ‘rain’, rather than from syntax. For (Recanati 2004), reference to
the location of rain is due to an optional pragmatic process of free enrichment.
Note that, as in the case of time, it is not uncommon to include, as in (Lewis
1980), a location parameter in the point of evaluation. (Predelli 2004) applies a
version of standard relativism to location, arguing that the variations in truth
value of “It is raining” are due to its being evaluated at different points of
evaluation. More concerned with cognitive issues, (Perry 1986) suggests that
in certain cases, as when the agent lacks any representation of location-
dependence, the thought that it is raining concerns a particular location
without yet representing it. The location, in turn, determines the truth value
of the thought, hence if the location changes, the truth value may change, too;
however, the content of the thought will remain the same.
Gradable adjectives and vagueness
The problem raised by gradable adjectives is to explain how the truth value of
a sentence such as “Josh is tall” may depend on some relevant comparison
15 (Cappelen and Lepore 2007) go literalist even for this case and hold, against any common
sense, that “It is raining” is true or false independently of any context or point of
evaluation.
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class – e.g. it may be true with respect to his colleagues at work, false with
respect to his basketball team. Contextualism is the dominant approach to
gradable adjectives; see e.g. (Kamp 1975), (Ludlow 1989), or (Kennedy and
McNally 2005). Literalism, i.e. the view that whether an individual is tall may
be settled independently of any context, is defended in (Cappelen and Lepore
2005), while (Richard 2004) opts for some sort of relativism.
There is a tight connection between gradable adjectives and vague
predicates, although vagueness concerns a broader class of expressions, and is
even believed by some to arise with any kind of linguistic construction. For
contextualist solutions to problems of vagueness (including the Sorites
paradoxes), see e.g. (Lewis 1979), (Bosch 1983), (Kamp and Partee 1995), (van
Deemter 1995), (Raffman 1996), (Fara 2000), (Shapiro 2006), and (Kennedy
2007).16
Predicates of color
As pointed out in Section 1, the term ‘contextualism’ sometimes refers to the
more marginal view on which in general, syntax, meaning, and semantically
constrained reference are altogether insufficient to determine truth conditions.
Imagine a situation in which the naturally red leaves of a Japanese maple tree
have been painted in green, and suppose that, pointing to them, Josh says:
(6) These leaves are green.
Contextualism holds that, despite of understanding the meaning of all the
16 I thank Paul Egré for suggesting some of this bibliography.
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words in (6) and of having identified the leaves referred to, context is still
needed in order to determine truth value. For, if uttered in a context in which
what is at stake is the observable color of leaves, (6) is true, but if uttered in a
context in which it is their natural color that matters, (6) seems false. This
“radical” form of contextualism is defended e.g. in (Searle 1980), (Travis 1996)
and to some extent in (Recanati 2004). Literalism holds that the only context-
sensitivity in (6) is that of the demonstrative and of the present tense – which
still leaves room for several options:
(i) insisting that there is a privileged sense of ‘green’ (e.g. the color of the
observable surface), so that (6) only has the first, true reading.
(ii) taking ‘x is green’ to be true if x is green in some way or another (so
that (6) will again only have a true reading).
(iii)acknowledging that there can be both a true and a false utterance of (6),
but insisting that they are utterances of sentences with different
meanings, the one involving ‘green1‘ which would mean something
like ‘green on observable surface’, and the other, the homonym
‘green2‘, which would mean something like ‘naturally green’.17
Let me also mention two other contextualist proposals: (Szabó 2001), which
treats predicates of color as involving an implicit argument and thus being
subject to the same kind of contextualist treatment as other indexicals, and
(Rothschild and Segal 2008), which treats them as indexical predicates. Finally,
17 For instance, Kennedy and McNally (2008) appeal to considerations regarding the
gradability of ‘green’ to argue that predicates of color give rise to systematic ambiguity.
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the proposal in (Predelli 2005b), which could qualify as “relativist”, is that if
we keep the referent of ‘these leaves’ fixed, the sentence will have a stable
semantic content, which is a function from points of evaluation to truth
values, but different contexts may determine different points of evaluation,
and, thereby, different truth values. For example, if (6) is evaluated in
situation in which what matters is the surface color of the leaves, it will be
true, but if it is evaluated in a situation in which their natural color matters, it
will be false.
It is worth emphasizing that for radical contextualists, color predicates are
just one instance of what they take to be a general phenomenon, namely, that
there is no way of determining meaning and truth conditions independently
of context. It is also worth noting that Predelli’s strategy, which roughly
consists in handling the contextual variations of truth value at a post-
compositional or, if you prefer, post-semantic stage, is also applicable across the
board.
Moral predicates and predicates of personal taste
Ethical relativism, i.e. the idea that what is morally right in one community
need not be so in another community, is a long standing position in moral
philosophy (see e.g. Harman 1975), and can be applied to the semantics of
predicates like ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ and of deontic expressions like ‘ought’. For a
contextualist take on moral predicates, see e.g. (Brogaard 2007).
Predicates of taste like ‘delicious’ are easily amenable to a relativist
treatment, the idea being that what is delicious for me need not be delicious
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for you: de gustibus non est disputandum. Note that in the moral case, the
relevant parameter of relativization is typically a community, while in the case
of taste, it can be, and often is, an individual. Relativist semantics for
predicates of personal taste is defended e.g. in (Kölbel 2002), (Lasersohn 2005)
or (Richard 2008). The proposal in (Stephenson 2007) combines relativism
(since there is a “judge” parameter in the point of evaluation) with
contextualism (since there is a silent nominal item PROj that picks out the
judge of evaluation). (Stojanovic 2008) argues that (standard) relativism and
(mainstream) contextualism not only yield the same predictions of truth
value, but are also on a par when trying to account for disagreement on
matters of taste. (Glanzberg 2007) defends a contextualist position, integrated
with a contextualist account of gradable adjectives.
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